Can a reviewing court, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, uphold a challenge for cause in a capital case on the basis of a potential juror's personal discomfort with the death penalty where that potential juror explicitly confirmed that she would follow the trial court's instructions and make a sentencing determination based on the law?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Wainwright v. Witt, this Court made clear that a juror should be removed for cause based on her views about capital punishment only if the “juror’s views ‘would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror.” 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)). If the juror “statels] clearly” that she is willing to “set aside [her] own beliefs in deference to the rule of law,” the juror is not subject to removal. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986). In this capital case, potential juror R.P. made clear that she could set aside her personal discomfort with the death penalty, follow the court’s instructions, and make a sentencing determination based on the law. While the lower court agreed that R.P.’s statements confirmed her ability to follow the law, the court nevertheless upheld the trial court’s removal for cause of potential juror R.P. based on speculation, holding that the trial court could have relied on “determinations of [R.P.’s] demeanor and credibility” in granting the challenge. Osgood v. State, CR-13-1416, 2016 WL 6136446, at *16 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 21, 2016). The record is devoid of evidence or statements to support this finding. The lower court’s holding gives rise to the following important question: Can a reviewing court, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, uphold a challenge for cause in a capital case on the basis of a potential juror’s personal discomfort with the death penalty where that potential juror explicitly confirmed that she would follow the trial court’s instructions and make a sentencing determination based on the law? i