When a federal district court denies a state prisoner's 28-U.S.C.-2254-petition based upon an improper standard-of-review

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) When a federal district court denies a state prisoner's 28 U.S.C. §2254 petition based upon an improper standard of review; (Harrington v. Richter 131 . S.Ct. 770(2011) any theory that could have supported denial of relief); con. __ trary to the requirements of the AEDPA and this Court's holdings in Ylst v. Nunnemaker 501 U.S. 797(1991) and Wilson v. Sellers 138 S.Ct. 1188(2018); could jurists of reason, contrary-to the Fifth Circuits ruling, debate the district court's resolution of that petition, or conclude the issue is deserving of encouragement to proceed further? And would Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) relief be appropriate in this instance? (2) When a state court decision is concededly contrary to Supreme Court precedent and the district court then denies relief based upon the Respondent's hypothetical Harrington theory; Harrington v. Richter 131 S.Ct. 770(2011); or Wilson v. Sellers "most likely relied on other 138 S.Ct. 1188 ,1186(2018), as being ueasonable applications of Supreme Court law, did that court impermissably expand the AEDPA to require petitioner to overcome both the contrary to and unreasonable application clauses of 28 U.S.C. §2254 (d)(1) before receiving de novo review of his constitutional claim? . (3) When this Court's decision in Wilson v. Sellers 138 S.Ct. 1188(2018) resolved an intra-circuit split within the Fifth Circuit in favor of the petioO tioner's previous federal filings was it unreasonable to deny the petitioner's pro-se request for a 14 day extension of time so that he may petition that court for rehearing en banc? -i