does extended, non-trespassory GPS monitoring that is quantifiably more invasive than a rudimentary beeper qualify as a Fourth Amendment search?

QUESTION PRESENTED Thirty-eight years ago, in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983), this Court held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements on a public highway, because the rudimentary beeper used by law enforcement only served to augment traditional visual surveillance. Subsequently, in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-413 (2012), this Court: (1) held that the warrantless installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle was a common-law trespass and a Fourth Amendment search; but (2) left unresolved what standards would apply to a case involving non-trespassory, longer term GPS monitoring. Finally, in Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018), this Court held that the government’s acquisition of cell-site location data was a Fourth Amendment search, because an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements. In this case, law enforcement officers used a sophisticated GPS tracking device placed on a vehicle to warrantlessly monitor Mr. Howard’s location for approximately one day. The officers did not maintain close physical proximity to the GPS tracker, nor use it to supplement their eyes-on surveillance: instead, the device created a precise, time-stamped log of Mr. Howard’s exact longitude, latitude, and street address every five seconds that the vehicle was in motion, and then transmitted that information directly to the smartphone of a law enforcement officer many miles away. ii The question presented is that left unanswered by Knotts, Jones, and Carpenter. does extended, non-trespassory GPS monitoring that is quantifiably more invasive than a rudimentary beeper qualify as a Fourth Amendment search? iii