Did the Ninth Circuit's disposition of Petitioners' claim under Article II's Appointments Clause contravene Eaton's longstanding rule?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In United States v. Eaton, 169 U.S. 331, 343 (1898), the Court held that a President cannot appoint a person to be a Principal Officer of the Executive Branch without concomitant Senate confirmation, unless there is an “exigency” that requires the person to serve in the position for “a limited time . . . under special and temporary conditions” (emphasis added). None of those exceptions, however, applied to the appointment of Matthew Whitaker as Acting Attorney General of the United States in November 2018, a position that he then held for more than three months. The question presented is as follows: Did the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of Petitioners’ claim under Article II’s Appointments Clause — namely, that Whitaker’s unconstitutional appointment tainted the government’s having secured the third superseding indictment in Petitioners’ underlying case — contravene Eaton’s longstanding rule, particularly considering that the government has never represented that Whitaker did not directly or indirectly impact the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California’s decision to seek that indictment in November 2018? -prefix