Are another individual's repeated statements confessing to the murders for which the defendant is on trial material for purpose of assessing the impact of the suppressed evidence? Does an appellate court err when it conducts a materiality analysis pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and does not consider some of the suppressed evidence and improperly discounts other portions of the suppressed evidence?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED On the evening of May 13, 1987, William and Juanita Leeman were repeatedly stabbed to death in their residence in Springfield Township Ohio. Ten years later Arizona authorities arrested Gary Hughbanks for the murder. Six days later, they obtained a statement from Hughbanks in which he incorrectly identified the murder weapon and items taken from the residence. He further misdescribed the victims’ residence and the clothes Ms. Leeman was wearing. During the course of the investigation, the police learned that two other individuals confessed to the murders. Unlike Hughbanks’ statement, their statements did not contradict the evidence surrounding the murders. The prosecution failed to provide these statements in discovery. The Sixth Circuit Panel did not consider either individual's inculpatory statements in conducting the materiality analysis required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1968). In addition, the Panel ignored other evidence, discounted yet other evidence and then failed to conduct a cumulative analysis of the suppressed evidence. This petition contains two important issues: Are another individual’s repeated statements confessing to the murders for which the defendant is on trial material for purpose of assessing the impact of the suppressed evidence? Does an appellate court err when it conducts a materiality analysis pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and does not consider some of the suppressed evidence and improperly discounts other portions of the suppressed evidence? i