Whether a pandemic overrides Amendment VII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether a pandemic overrides Amendment VII, which states, “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,” when the district court judge stated, “Obviously given where we are, the Court is not having any jury trials at this time, and the jury trials that we did have scheduled ... and a lot of the first part of 2021 is already consumed with trial settings,” than scheduled the jury trial, but granted summary judgment to the moving party “the first part of 2021.” 2. Whether the Fifth Circuit can require a “judgment or order” to have jurisdiction over a non-appealed denial motion to recuse under § 455(a), thereby declining to address the Petitioner's “Statement of the Issues Presented for Review,” under Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5), regarding the magistrate judge, refused to recuse because the litigant's request was “too late,” because an order was "outside of an explicitly designated order in the notice of appeal," as this opinion shows conflicts amongst circuit Courts adhering to a “timeliness” motion not set by Congress, but allows the Fifth Circuit to remain silent on a non-appealed denial motion to recuse. 3. Whether the Fifth Circuit in Appeals I, disregarded this Court’s precedent in Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media, 589 U.S._ (2020), by failing to mandate the district court addressed and required the Petitioner's Race Discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, meet the “But-For” Causation Standard, instead of the appellate court pairing Race Discrimination claims under Title VII with claims under § 1981 to be “analyzed under the evidentiary framework” to meet the “McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework” when affirming summary judgment. 4, Whether the Fifth Circuit err when applying de novo standard of review when barring a litigant claims under the Law of the Case Doctrine, as this opinion shows consensus amongst the Seventh and the Court of Appeal of Indiana, but conflicts with the Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, Supreme Court of Florida and Court of Appeal of California. 5. Whether an appellate court in Appeals II can verbatim take facts from its previous ruling in Appeals I and apply it in Appeals II when reviewing a trial court grant of summary judgment in Summary II under de novo standard of review as this conflicts with the Sixth circuit. 6. Whether appellate courts can override State regulations by implementing that a litigant needs to show a violation of State Law to meet the requirements under the Louisiana Whistleblower Statute when the Louisiana Supreme Court did not "directly addressed" in the statute whether a litigant "must prove an actual violation of state law." @ 7. Whether a litigant claiming "emotional distress" without medical treatment is grounds for a "probable cause" that would grant an employer full access to an employee medical records to search "any mental or physical conditions which could have led to the claimed damages," when Amendment IV stipulates a "right of the people to be secure in their "papers" ... "against unreasonable searches and seizures," as circuit courts conflicts on whether employers should be granted access to litigants medical records in the absence of medical treatments for "emotional distress." 8. Whether the Fifth Circuit err when waiving the litigant's “challenge to the evidence” of an employer submission of unsigned and unsigned sealed documents “in support of its summary judgment motion,” because the litigant failure to file a motion to strike or object, as this decision conflicts with the 7th Circuit, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(g)(2)(C) requiring the Court to strike unsigned documents once brought its attention. (ui)