Whether a defendant's otherwise clear invocation of his right to represent himself becomes equivocal when he prefers representation by an attorney who cannot or will not represent him

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Faretta v. California, this Court held that the Sixth Amendment protects the “fundamental” right of a criminal defendant to “conduct his own defense.” 422 U.S. 806, 817, 836 (1975). In order to exercise this right, a defendant must “unequivocally” assert his intention to represent himself and “knowingly and intelligently forgo [the] traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” Jd. at 835 (internal quotation omitted). This Court has emphasized that a defendant’s lack of legal skill has “no bearing” on whether he may represent himself. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993). Even if a defendant “may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834. State high courts and the federal courts of appeals, however, have devised conflicting legal standards for unequivocal invocation and intelligent waiver. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a defendant’s otherwise clear invocation of his right to represent himself becomes equivocal when he prefers representation by an attorney who cannot or will not represent him. 2. Whether courts may override a defendant’s right to represent himself in a high-penalty case out of fear that he will be unable to represent himself well.