Whether Fourth Amendment reasonableness concerns have any bearing on a determination of custody under Miranda

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Berkemer v. McCarty, this Court determined that generally the “roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop” does not automatically amount to a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, as “the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop,’ than to a formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435 (1984). Since this Court’s decision in Berkemer, the permissible scope of police authority has greatly expanded beyond the original contours envisioned by Terry, allowing law enforcement to utilize methods of force that are more traditionally associated with an arrest rather than an investigative detention. As a result, a circuit split has emerged between the U.S. Courts of Appeal regarding the interplay of Terry and Miranda, specifically whether Fourth Amendment reasonableness concerns have any bearing on a determination of custody under Miranda. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals improperly answered this question in the affirmative. The questions presented are: 1. Whether Fourth Amendment reasonableness concerns have any bearing on a determination of custody under Miranda, specifically in regards to whether an individual is subjected to a restraint on their freedom of movement to a degree associated with a formal arrest? 2. Whether the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals improperly considered Fourth Amendment reasonableness concerns and failed to consider all of the objective circumstances of Ms. Wexler’s questioning when it determined that she was not in custody for purposes of Miranda? 3. Whether Ms. Wexler was in custody for purposes of Miranda when she was ordered out of a residence by law enforcement who informed her that they had a search warrant, removed from that residence by SWAT-like officers, and placed into the back of a patrol car? ii