May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seize for union speech payments from an employee who has notified the State that he is a nonmember and objects to supporting union speech?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, this Court held that public employees have a right to refuse to subsidize union speech, that “States and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees,” that “Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from anonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed,” and that “the waiver must be freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence.” 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (citations omitted), overruling Abood v. Detroit Bad. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Furthermore, while “most personal constitutional rights may be waived,” Class v. U.S., 1388 8.Ct. 798, 808 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting), this Court “indulge[s] every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “To establish a valid waiver, the State must show that the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the ‘high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] JoAnson.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010) (Scalia, J.), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 475 (1966). California, like many other states, resists Janus’s holding by enforcing “waivers” obtained prior to Janus’s restoration of public employees’ full First Amendment rights, and by vesting sole authority to -iidetermine the validity of dues checkoff revocations in entities financially benefitting from compelled fees or dues seizures: public-employee labor unions. The Ninth Circuit below — along with the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits — have upheld this and similar restrictions, holding that the State does not require evidence of a waiver to restrict employees’ exercise of their First Amendment rights under Janus, and that proof of an employee’s contractual consent is sufficient to continue government fees or dues seizures from his wages despite his resignation and objection. The questions presented are: 1. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seize for union speech payments from an employee who has notified the State that he is a nonmember and objects to supporting union speech? 2. May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, seize for union speech payments from an employee absent clear and compelling evidence that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his First Amendment right under the standard set forth in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)?