Ernest Romond Gibbs, Jr. v. United States
HabeasCorpus
Whether a district court violates Pepper v. United States when it refuses to allow a defendant to proffer evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation at resentencing
QUESTION PRESENTED In Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), this Court held that a district court, in resentencing a defendant, may consider evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation and that it may (although it need not) reward that evidence with a lower sentence. In Mr. Gibbs’ case, the Eleventh Circuit held that, contrary to Pepper’s mandate, a resentencing court may bar evidence of postsentencing rehabilitation at the courthouse door, that is, refuse to admit and review Pepper evidence at all. In the Eleventh Circuit, then, a district court, as it resentences a defendant, is empowered to refuse a proffer of post-sentencing rehabilitation evidence. The rule there violates both the letter and spirit of Pepper. Not only has the panel betrayed precedent from this Court, but its rule diverges from every other circuit court to consider the question. We now have a circuit split on this question: Upon resentencing following a direct appeal and remand, or the granting of a § 2255 motion, does a district court violate Pepper when it refuses to allow a defendant to proffer evidence of post-sentencing rehabilitation and when the court refuses to look at such evidence at all?