Alfred E. Daking, Jr. v. United States
AdministrativeLaw SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
Whether the expanded compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A), triggers any sentencing guideline policy statements when defendants file their own motions
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98478, Tit. II, ch. II, 98 Sta. 1987; 18 U.S.C. §3551, et seq.), it provided a few exceptions to the general rule that final judgments are unassailable. One of the exceptions was relief from a judgment through compassionate release, provided for in 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). This exception was recently expanded by the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, §603(b) (2018) (“FSA 2018”), which for the first time allowed defendants to file their own compassionate release motions with the courts. The question presented for review in this case is whether the expanded compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A) (2018), triggers any sentencing guideline policy statements when defendants file their own motions, specifically whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is applicable to defendant-filed motions, or whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is inapplicable to such defendant-filed motions. This question is the subject of a circuit split with eight circuits agreeing that U.S.S.G. §1B1.13 does not bind defendant-filed motions, while the Eleventh Circuit alone, finds that §1B1.13 is binding and limits defendant-filed compassionate release motions. ‘ INTERESTED PARTIES There are no