Whether a state court's decision on direct appeal is based on an unreasonable determination of facts when it concludes that a defendant refused to cooperate with a mitigation specialist and was competent and understood the consequences of his decision, while ignoring evidence in the record to the contrary, when the trial court allowed him to overrule his trial counsel's decision to request a continuance to conduct a full and adequate mitigation investigation

QUESTION PRESENTED In March 1997, a jury convicted George Russell Kayer of capital murder. Only after his conviction, and just two months before his sentencing hearing, did the trial court appoint a mitigation specialist to his case. At a presentencing conference, counsel for Kayer requested a three-to-six month continuance to allow for counsel and their mitigation specialist to investigate and prepare mitigation evidence for the sentencing hearing. Despite counsel’s learned and informed decision that more time was needed to investigate, the trial court allowed Kayer to overrule his counsel’s request for a continuance and proceed to sentencing with an incomplete mitigation case. The trial court sentenced Kayer to death. The question presented is whether a state court’s decision on direct appeal is based on an unreasonable determination of facts when it concludes that a defendant refused to cooperate with a mitigation specialist and was competent and understood the consequences of his decision, while ignoring evidence in the record to the contrary, when the trial court allowed him to overrule his trial counsel’s decision to request a continuance to conduct a full and adequate mitigation investigation. i