Does § 3583(e)(8) as applied here violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by authorizing punishment beyond the maximum for a conviction, based solely on a judge's preponderance finding of a supervised-release violation?

QUESTION PRESENTED When Congress created the novel system of supervised release for federal criminal defendants, it authorized district judges to act as factfinders and impose new punishment in revocation proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Those proceedings ordinarily do not require the constitutional safeguards of an original prosecution, because postrevocation sanctions are treated as part of the penalty for the underlying conviction and usually don’t raise the minimum or surpass the maximum. But in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369 (2019), the Court recognized that a revocation provision mandating an increased minimum sentence violated constitutional guarantees of due process and trial by jury. This case presents a closely related question that Haymond left open: whether the same juryless procedure presents the same constitutional problems when it increases punishment at the other end, authorizing imprisonment beyond the maximum for the conviction. After serving the statutory maximum 10 years for his conviction, Mr. Sharpe was reimprisoned for another 2 years because a judge found he violated conditions of his supervised release. His imprisonment for 12 years would have been unlawful for the conviction itself, without new factfinding. He presents this question: Does § 3583(e)(8) as applied here violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments by authorizing punishment beyond the maximum for a conviction, based solely on a judge’s preponderance finding of a supervised-release violation?