Can the 'law enforcement proviso' exception to the FTCA's exclusion of intentional torts by law enforcement officers (acting within the scope of their employment) be used when an intentionally overbroad ministerial pre-filing order is made by a US District Court Judge if the order is an abuse of process against or malicious prosecution of a judicial-corruption whistle-blower who tries to assert his US Constitutional rights.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Can the “law enforcement proviso” exception to the FTCA’s exclusion of intentional torts by law enforcement officers (acting within the scope of their employment) be used when an intentionally overbroad ministerial pre-filing order is made by a US District Court Judge if the order is an abuse of process against or malicious prosecution of a judicial-corruption whistle-blower who tries to assert his US Constitutional rights. __. Here, an overbroad and. global (i.e. not. narrowlytailored) vexatious litigant pre-filing order was issued by US District Court Judge E.M. Chen against whistle-blower Kinney. Kinney filed a FTCA claim and. after it was denied, a complaint was filed. Kinney’s complaint was dismissed sua sponte. Kinney’s appeal paperwork was sent to the wrong court and then dismissed sua sponte. Are vexatious litigant laws unconstitutionally vague when an overbroad pre-filing restriction is placed upon a whistle-blower petitioner? Is a federal Judge a law enforcement officer with the power to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests for violations of Federal law (e.g. contempt powers) so that the Judge is subject to the FTCA’s “law enforcement proviso” exception? Does USDC Judge Chen have immunity for his ministerial (non-judicial) acts that constitute an abuse of process or malicious prosecution against a whistle-blower? i