Can reasonable jurists debate whether federal armed bank robbery by intimidation, under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the offense doesn't require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force?

QUESTION PRESENTED Federal bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is a general intent offense, see Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000), and the statute doesn’t require the defendant to intend to intimidate anyone. The statute also doesn’t require a defendant to use or threaten to use violent physical force to intimidate. Under this Court’s precedents, predicate crimes of violence must involve the intentional use of force, see Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 (2021), and the physical force must be “capable of causing physical pain or injury.” See, e.g., Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 553-54 (2019). Petitioner challenged his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction alleging that the predicate offense, federal bank robbery, was not a categorical crime of violence. The district court denied relief, and the Court of Appeals denied a certificate of appealability, citing its own caselaw holding that federal bank robbery is a crime of violence. The question presented is: Can reasonable jurists debate whether federal armed bank robbery by intimidation, under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), is a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because the offense doesn’t require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force? pretix