Is a prosecutor's statement that he believed he could discriminatorily remove African-American jurors from the panel as long as he left one African-American juror on the panel a 'race-neutral reason' as required by Batson v. Kentucky and the United States Constitution?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE , Victor Taylor was tried in March, 1986, immediately prior to this Court’s decision in Batson v. Kentucky, by a prosecutor from the same office that tried Batson. Taylor objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove four of the six African-American jurors from the panel. In response to the objection, the prosecutor gave his reason for striking the African-American jurors: “In accordance with case law, the Commonwealth has no other rational reason -if I strike all it then becomes objectionable under the cases from, as I understand it, coming from California.” Kentucky’s highest court addressed Victor Taylor’s Batson v. Keniucky claim two different times: in the direct appeal (Taylor J, and in the first post-conviction appeal (Taylor IJ). In Taylor I, the state-court summarily rejected Taylor's Batson claim in a single sentence. In Taylor II, the same court wrote a reasoned opinion and explained its rationale for rejecting the claim on direct appeal. Taylor later sought habeas relief in federal district court. The district court denied relief. On appeal, a slim majority of the en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed, but in doing so, the majority refused to “look through” to the Kentucky Supreme Court’s actual rationale for denying the Batson claim. Instead, the majority looked to the summary denial of the Batson claim in Taylor I, and proceeded to speculate regarding what rationale “could” have supported its decision. -i In Wilson v. Sellers this Court held that when a state court decision denies a prisoner’s federal claim on the merits but does not give a reason for the denial, a federal court reviewing the claim in habeas corpus should “look through” the unexplained state court decision “to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale.” In Wilson, the last related state-court decision was an earlier decision by a lower Georgia state court. In the instant case, the last related state-court decision was the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor II. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ treatment of Victor Taylor's Batson claim raises the following important questions: 1. Is a statement by the prosecutor that he believed he could discriminatorily remove African-American jurors from the panel as long as he left one AfricanAmerican juror on the panel, a “race-neutral reason” as required by Batson v. Kentucky and the United States Constitution, particularly in this instance, when the prosecutor used a widely disparate number of his peremptory challenges to remove black jurors as opposed to white jurors and the prosecutor admitted he had “no other rational reason” than the race of the jurors for exercising his peremptory challenges? 2. Was the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals required to “look through” the unexplained state court decision to the “last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale,” or was it at liberty to supplant its own speculative reasons without deference to the state court? Bis