Whether the definition of 'lascivious exhibition' in the federal child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, is limited by the term it is defining and the statutory definitions that accompany it, or whether the Dost factors authorize a broader interpretation

QUESTION PRESENTED The D.C. Circuit recently held that the definition of “lascivious exhibition” in the federal child pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2256, is limited by the term it is defining -“sexually explicit conduct” -and by the statutory definitions that accompany it. United States v. Hillie, 14 F.4th 677 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Other circuits, including the Ninth Circuit, interpret the phrase “lascivious exhibition” more expansively by conducting a case-by-case analysis using the factors listed in United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1987). The question presented is whether an instruction on the Dost factors authorizes a conviction for production of child pornography on broader grounds than authorized by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2256. 1