Whether a district court may enter a post-appeal order to place findings and calculations on the record of a case to explain an earlier oral ruling denying a defendant's § 3164 motion for release

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, provides that the trial of a person being detained solely because they are awaiting trial shall commence not later than 90 days following the beginning of such continuous detention. § 3164(a)(D&(b). The remedy available to such person for violation of the 90 day limit is release from custody pending trial. § 3164(c). In calculating the 90 day period, the periods of delay in § 3161(h) are excluded. The case before this Honorable Court presents four questions which divide the courts of appeals: 1. Whether, in light of this Court's ruling in Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 164 L. Ed. 2D 749 (2006) and Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S. Ct. 400, 74 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1982), may a Court of Appeals, subsequent to a defendant filing a timely notice of appeal challenging a district court's oral and written denial of defendant's motion for release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3164(c), consider an additional order entered after the notice of appeal by the district court offering speedy trial findings, analysis, and calculations not made prior to the oral and written denial appealed from? 2. Whether, in absence of an oral or written order entered into the docket of a criminal case at the outset of a specific period of time, may the period of time in question subsequently be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7) by an order operating retroactively? The Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th, and 11th have answered in the negative. The 6th Circuit, in the instant case, has decided to allow a retroactive exclusion. The 9th Circuit has thus far avoided deciding the issue. District Courts in the 1st and 5th Circuits have expressed agreement but the Courts of Appeals have not expressly ruled on the issue. 3. Whether, blanket, district-wide findings made by a single district judge, without case-specific considerations or findings addressing the needs of individual cases, may operate to toll the speedy trial clock in every criminal case within a district? 4. Whether a district court may order an open-ended continuance, containing no definitive end date, under 18 U.S.C. 3161(h)(7)(A)? The 2nd and 9th Circuits has answered in the negative. The Ist, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 10th Circuits have answered in the affirmative. ; i Be |