Does the Constitution permit the exclusion of a defendant's presentation of substantial evidence of third-party culpability simply because the court believes the prosecution has presented evidence of the defendant's guilt?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Ten years after three victims were found dead in Riverside County, California, authorities charged Mr. Pape and his friend Cristin Smith with their murders. The prosecution’s theory was that one of the victims, Mr. Pape’s exgirlfriend, intended to see him on the night of the crimes, as evidenced by her alleged statements to a third party. Defense counsel sought to introduce evidence from nine witnesses that two other men — including the third-party who testified about the victim’s hearsay statements — actually committed the crimes. The trial court excluded the defense in its entirety, based on its perception of the strength of the prosecution’s case. The court of appeal endorsed that view and compounded the trial court’s error by refusing to apply this Court’s well-established jurisprudence regarding the right to present a defense. Instead, the court reviewed the error under state law, holding inter alia, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony because its admission would have resulted in a “minitrial.” This case presents questions of critical importance and warrants this Court’s plenary review: 1. Does the Constitution permit the exclusion of a defendant’s presentation of substantial evidence of third-party culpability simply because the court believes the prosecution has presented evidence of the defendant’s guilt? 2. May a court condition the presentation of a third-party culpability defense upon the defendant demonstrating that there is “direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual ii perpetration of the crime”? And, if so, may a court apply that standard to require a defendant to disprove any circumstances that may exculpate the third party before being permitted to present the defense to the jury?