Should courts defer to Sentencing-Guidelines-commentary when there is no ambiguity in the underlying-text?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993), this Court found the Sentencing Guidelines to be “the equivalent of legislative rules adopted by federal agencies.” Id. at 45. Thus, this Court applied the Seminole Rock doctrine, which provides that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is to be given “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Id. at 47 (citation omitted). In Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 8 Ct. 2400 (2019), this Court recognized the dangers posed by reflexive judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and ruled that such deference should only be afforded if the underlying regulation is determined to be “genuinely ambiguous,” and that a court must first “exhaust all the ‘traditional tools of construction” in analyzing the regulation in question. Id. at 2408 and 2415. The circuits are openly split as to when Stinson deference is appropriate, and/or how Kisor limits Stinson with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines’ commentary and how it is to be interpreted and applied, if at all. The Third, Sixth, and D.C. circuits have all applied Kisor, and held that courts owe no deference to Guidelines commentary when the underlying Guidelines text is not ambiguous. At least five other circuits disagree. Thus, Mr. Duke presents the following questions: 1. Should courts defer to Sentencing Guidelines commentary when there is no ambiguity in the underlying text? 2. Has the Commission impermissibly expanded the definition of “controlled substance offense” through the commentary by including “attempt” crimes when those crimes are absent from the Guidelines definition found in § 4B1.2(b)? i