Does the application of a stricter standard of review in assessing the substantive reasonableness of terrorism sentences contravene Gall and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), this Court held that appellate courts must review the substantive reasonableness of all sentences under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, in recognition of district judges’ superior vantage point in weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors as to individual defendants. In a series of decisions, the Second Circuit, based on its view that “terrorism is different,” has applied a far stricter standard -amounting to de novo review -to reverse sentences in terrorism cases as too low and substantively unreasonable. In the Circuit’s view, in terrorism cases, one factor -the seriousness of the offense -swamps all others and precludes sentences toward the lower end of the statutory range set by Congress. Other Circuits have also adopted this approach. The question presented is: Does the application of a stricter standard of review in assessing the substantive reasonableness of terrorism sentences contravene Gall and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)? i