Whether a final order of dismissal automatically moots an interlocutory appeal of an order denying preliminary injunctive relief

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Although "an appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction becomes moot when the trial court enters a permanent injunction” incorporating the same relief, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 314 (1999), this Court has made clear that “[a] quite different situation obtains ... where ... the substantive validity of the final [order] does not establish the substantive validity of the preliminary one,” id. at 315 (“It would make no sense, when this is the claim, to say that the preliminary [order] merges into the final [order]’). Notwithstanding, where a case becomes moot on appeal, this Court has recognized that vacatur is the “established practice” to prevent a district court’s order, “unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences." United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-41 (1950). However, in dismissing Petitioner’s appeal of the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief as moot, Eleventh Circuit Judges Jill Pryor, Britt Grant, and Barbara Lagoa (“the panel”) held that “fbjecause the district court has subsequently entered a final order of dismissal, any appeal from the district court’s interlocutory denial of preliminary injunctive relief has merged into the final order and consequently rendered any direct appeal from the May 14 order moot.” App. A at 3 (App. 3a). Compounding matters further, even though it concluded that Petitioner’s appeal had become moot, the panel nevertheless declined to vacate the district court’s order. Moreover, the panel effectively denied Petitioner the right to petition for rehearing en banc by denying Petitioner’s motion to publish its decision and relying upon Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-4(b) which prohibits orders dismissing an appeal that aren’t published from being considered by the court en banc. App. I at 2 (App. 46a). i . This Petition presents the following issues: I. Whether a final order of dismissal automatically moots an interlocutory appeal of an order denying preliminary injunctive relief, and if so, whether vacatur of the preliminary order, review of which was prevented through happen-stance, is required to prevent it from spawning any legal consequences without being subject to appellate scrutiny. II. Whether the panel's decision to summarily dismiss Petitioner’s appeal as moot via an unpublished opinion after denying him an opportunity for oral argument and delaying review until the district court eventually disposed of the underlying case nearly four months after Petitioner’s appeal was filed comports with the fundamental rights to due process and to petition the government for redress of grievances guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. III. Whether the panel’s failure to vacate the district court’s preliminary order under these circumstances constitutes a denial of equal protection in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. IV. Whether the panel’s holding undermines the purpose of the rule allowing appeals from final orders to draw in question all prior non-final orders and rulings which produced the judgment. V. Whether Eleventh Circuit Rule 35-4(b) deprives litigants of the right to petition for rehearing en banc under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(b) in violation of the Supremacy Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 2072. ii