Whether trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington where counsel met with petitioner for less than 15 minutes before trial

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Prior to trying Petitioner’s capital case, trial counsel met with Petitioner to discuss the case only once, for less than fifteen minutes, on the first day of jury selection. Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective where, as a result of failing to meet with him, trial counsel failed to recognize or rebut critical issues concerning the victim’s time of death. Petitioner also claimed that his right to confront the witnesses against him was violated where the testifying medical examiner relied upon out-of-court statements — made after authorities had already identified Petitioner as their primary suspect, by medical-examiner personnel who were not subjected to cross examination — in order to establish the victim’s time of death. The Third Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability on these claims, finding that both were so insubstantial they were not deserving of appellate review. The Questions Presented are: 1. Whether, in accordance with Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003), Petitioner made a showing that reasonable jurists would debate whether trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where trial counsel met with Petitioner to discuss his capital case for the first time for less than fifteen minutes on the first day of jury selection? 2. Whether, in accordance with Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003), Petitioner made a showing that reasonable jurists would debate — in a “somewhat unsettled” area of law where the District Court remarked that Petitioner had raised “compelling arguments” — whether Petitioner established a Confrontation Clause violation under Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), where the trial court admitted out-of-court statements made by medical-examiner personnel after authorities had already identified Petitioner as their primary suspect, and the error was not harmless because Petitioner’s conviction was otherwise based on “purely circumstantial evidence”? i