Did the Ninth Circuit's opinion create a conflict with relevant decisions of this Court in concluding that Sullivan's standard applies only when a defense lawyer concurrently represents multiple clients with conflicting interests?

QUESTION PRESENTED In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980), this Court held that an attorney whose representation is adversely affected by a conflict of interest is constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. Once an actual conflict has been demonstrated, prejudice is presumed, since the harm may consist not only of what counsel does, but of what he “finds himself compelled to refrain from doing” in his representation of the defendant. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (emphasis in original). In Noguera’s capital trial, counsel labored under a conflict of interest because he was retained by Noguera’s mother, who counsel represented during her acrimonious divorce proceedings from Noguera’s father just a few months before the homicide. At Noguera’s mother’s direction, counsel refrained from investigating and presenting alternative motives for the crime or a case for mitigation. The district court found that Noguera was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Sullivan and Wood v. Georgia. In a split decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the underlying state-court decision was reasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because Sullivan does not apply to conflicts arising from successive representation. The question presented is: Did the Ninth Circuit's opinion create a conflict with relevant decisions of this Court in concluding that Sullivan’s standard applies only when a defense lawyer concurrently represents multiple clients with conflicting interests? i