Did the Oregon Supreme Court violate Long's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process prior to deprivation of his property interest

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Federal protection of individuals from the arbitrary exercise of power by state government is at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection guarantees, but principles of comity and federalism may restrict the lower federal courts from protecting this core value in the context of state attorney discipline proceedings. See e.g. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982). Petitioner Andrew Long, a well-regarded legal scholar and former law professor with no history of : misconduct, has consistently denied all allegations put forward by the Oregon State Bar (OSB) ; disciplinary attorneys, identified evidence of improper motives for their attack on him, and has : . repeatedly advanced constitutional arguments requiring dismissal in the state proceedings below. Yet, he endured a prehearing suspension, extended indefinitely for nearly four years as OSB , ; attorneys announced their intent to disbar him, and then set about manufacturing a reason to do so by paying up to $31,689.29 to obtain testimony through apparently felonious bribery. Ultimately, the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion, without commenting on any detail in Long’s actual constitutional arguments, disposed of all constitutional issues in one generic and demonstrably incorrect statement about the record, relied directly on the $31,689.29 testimony, and disbarred him. Long suggests the case epitomizes arbitrary exercise of state power and seeks certiorari on the following issues: 1. Did the Oregon Supreme Court violate Long’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process prior to deprivation of his property interest where its order of disbarment: a. Rests on uncorroborated testimonial evidence obtained by OSB attorneys’ apparent felonious bribery of a witness in violation of ethical prohibitions on | contingent payments to fact witnesses for testimony? b. Followed 45 months of indefinite interim suspension (initiated by allegations that have since been dismissed), during which OSB attorneys announced their intent to i “see what we can do about getting [Long] disbarred,” and then began to assemble the present case by offering payments to clients injured by the suspension in apparent quid pro quo for testimony that could justify disbarment? c. Relies on the opinion of a trial-level adjudicator who was previously disqualified in the related (now dismissed) companion case for apparent bias against Long and had plainly omitted several of Long’s evidentiary exhibits from the record? d. Included the participation of Justice Thomas A. Balmer despite Long’s motion to disqualify him for appearance of bias where then-Chief Justice Balmer alone signed the orders imposing and maintaining the indefinite suspension such that he should be presumed to have an interest in confirming his earlier judgment? 2. Does the Equal Protection Clause prohibit the Oregon Supreme Court from disbarring Long as a result of OSB’s singular hostility toward him, which, without rational basis, was far more aggressive than in contemporaneous cases of similarly situated attorneys, such as one who discharged seven rounds from a weapon into an office building after driving “black-out drunk” to do so, was convicted of a crime, and was subsequently convicted of another crime for manufacturing illegal drugs in his basement, where OSB did not prosecute his violence and threats to clients and intentionally discouraged proof of violations similar to those on which Long was disbarred? | | | . ii