Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) fits under the 'public-welfare-exception' to the presumption of mens rea when the statute does not involve 'dangerous-and-deleterious-devices'

QUESTION PRESENTED Since the founding, courts have presumed that Congress intended a mens rea for every federal criminal offense. Rehaif v. United States, 1389 S. Ct. 2191, 2195-96 (2019). The Court has identified a “limited” exception to this basic principle for some “public welfare” and “regulatory’ offenses” that deal with “dangerous and deleterious devices.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606, 612 n.6 (1994). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the exception also applies to some immigration statutes, including 8 U.S.C. § 1825(a)(1).That statutory provision makes it a crime for an “alien” to “enter[] or attempt[] to enter the United States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers[.]” This provision has no express mens rea, and any scienter would thus need to be implied through the common-law presumption of mens rea. : The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) fits under the exception to the presumption of mens rea when the statute does not involve “dangerous and deleterious devises.” i