Does the Supreme Court's leeway, and the Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") deference, for lower courts to determine due process violations, yield arbitrary and conflicting decisions that, in turn, reduce due process to mere judicial whimsy, making trial-court-instructional-error-due-process-violation determinations freewheeling, unbound, and thus constitutionally unreliable? And, if so, does this case present the opportunity to correct that with clearly established guidance, where the ailing reasonable provocation instruction itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process?

Does the Supreme Court's leeway and the Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) deference for lower courts to determine due process violations yield arbitrary and conflicting decisions that reduce due process to mere judicial whimsy, making determinations freewheeling, unbound, and thus constitutionally unreliable?