Whether the trial court deprived Haro of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted at trial the unconfronted, out-of-court testimony of a material witness, ignoring the mandate of Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5), where the Government's negligence had rendered the witness unavailable?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Writing for the majority in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 375 (2008), Justice Scalia wrote of his dissenting colleagues: The larger problem with the dissent’s argument, however, is that the guarantee of confrontation is no guarantee at all if it is subject to whatever exceptions courts from time to time consider “fair.” It is not the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the Sixth Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts’ views) those underlying values. In Giles, the Court reaffirmed the constitutional principle that admission at trial of unconfronted, out-of-court testimony from an unavailable witness, was not an exception to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence where the defendant had done nothing to cause the witness to be unavailable. Here, Haro did not make the material witness unavailable, it was the Government who did so, through multiple negligent actions. Therefore, the issue in this Petition is: 1. Whether the trial court deprived Haro of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when it admitted at trial the unconfronted, out-of-court testimony of a material witness, ignoring the mandate of Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5), where the Government’s negligence had rendered the witness unavailable?