Whether a mens rea applies to the elements of an aggravated drug importation offense, where those elements substantially increase the statutory minimum and maximum sentence

QUESTION PRESENTED By common-law tradition, criminal intent (or “mens rea”) is presumptively a part of “every crime,” “even where the statutory definition d[oes] not in terms include it.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 258 (1952). But in the late twentieth century, a wave of new legislation raised “[t]he question of how to define a‘crime.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 105 (2013) (plurality opinion). These new laws mandated enhanced penalties when offenses involved specific, aggravated facts. It was only in recent years that this Court deemed such aggravated facts to be “elements” of a crime—not mere “sentencing factors.” Id. at 103, 105-106; id. at 111-17 (majority opinion). That development sparked a new controversy, concerning whether the presumption of mens rea applies to the elements defining an aggravated offense. The question presented here is: Whether a mens rea applies to the elements of an aggravated drug importation offense, where those elements substantially increase the statutory minimum and maximum sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b). prefix