Does the Sixth Amendment require a trial court to conduct a competency colloquy where a defendant makes a mid-trial demand to represent himself?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Does the Sixth Amendment require a trial court to conduct a competency colloquy, pursuant to this Court's holding in Faretta v. California, where a defendant makes a | mid-trial demand to represent himself (alleging a conflict with counsel), and if so, is the trial court required to conduct the colloquy and allow that defendant to proceed pro se if it determines _ heiscompetent? ; ; ; The Wisconsin Court of Appeals announced a rule that a Faretta-based competency | colloquy isn't mandatory where a defendant makes an unequivocal request to proceed pro se midtrial. A decision from this Court will clarify both the need for secured autonomy and conflict-free | counsel, and clarify whether or not a state is permitted to force unwanted counsel onto a | defendant in the middle of trial; a situation likely to reoccur. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuit join the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ rationale, and also hold that untimeliness of a pro se request can serve as a stand-alone reason to deny but this Court hasn’t announced such an exception to its holding in Faretta. : 2. Was the Petitioner denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and does the Constitution require an appellate court to apply the cumulative error analysis to ineffective assistance of counsel claims pursuant to the principles of this Court's holding in Kyles v. Whitley, and Chambers v. Mississippi? The Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not weigh the totality of counsel's deficiencies in making its determination on prejudice. The Ninth Circuit suggests } . cumulative error analysis is one of ‘kind’ and must be presented as such. The Eighth : . Circuit appears to reject cumulative-error analysis when claims are mixed. A decision . _ from this Court will clarify when a court must address, and apply cumulative-error . | : analysis. . . . Bo, . | 3. Was the Petitioner deprived of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a | | fair trial where the defense was taken by surprise by the evidence offered, and if so, pursuant to oo this Court's holding in Oregon v. Kennedy, does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bar retrial where a multitude of prosecutorial misconduct was undertaken to goad the defense into asking for a mistrial, and where the judge prevented juror review of admitted exculpatory police reports subsequent to an expression of a fear of dismissal? A decision from this Court will clarify when variance in allegations becomes fatal where a surprise mid-trial allegation carries a mandatory minimum punishment, where | the broader statute under which a defendant was charged does not. A decision from this Court will also clarify at what level judicial and prosecutorial misconduct will bar retrial. , ii :