Whether plainly overbroad statutory language is sufficient to establish a prior conviction is broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision?

QUESTION PRESENTED The categorical approach, as applied in the criminal context, requires comparison of the elements of a defendant’s prior conviction with the generic definition of a sentencing enhancement provision. Based upon this principle, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that unambiguously overbroad statutory language alone establishes a prior conviction is broader than the generic definition. The Eighth and Fifth Circuits disagree. These circuits interpret Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007), to require defendants to point to a case-specific example where the statute was applied in an overbroad manner, even if a statute is overbroad on its face. The question presented is: Whether plainly overbroad statutory language is sufficient to establish a prior conviction is broader than the generic definition of a criminal sentencing enhancement provision? i