Whether the rule in Simmons v. South Carolina, as applied in Lynch v. Arizona, must be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review

QUESTION PRESENTED In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), this Court held that in cases where a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury that he will be ineligible for parole if not sentenced to death. For many years thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to apply Simmons. In Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), this Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme Court’s misapplication of Simmons and confirmed that the Simmons rule applies in Arizona. This petition is brought by a capital defendant in Arizona whose conviction became final after Simmons but before Lynch. He was sentenced to death after the trial judge repeatedly denied him his right under Simmons to inform the jury that he was parole-ineligible. After this Court in Lynch applied Simmons to Arizona, he sought postconviction relief in state court seeking the relief that Simmons and Lynch require. The Arizona Supreme Court denied his claim. Although Arizona provides a forum for federal constitutional claims on collateral review, and although the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that Lynch “was dictated by” Simmons, the court concluded that the rule of Lynch should not apply to cases pending on collateral review. This petition presents the question whether this Court’s decision in Lynch applied a settled rule of federal law that must be applied to cases pending on collateral review in Arizona. (i)