Whether the Eleventh Circuit's purported 'inextricably intertwined' standard for evaluating jurisdictional claims under Rooker-Feldman arbitrarily and impermissibly limits district courts' subject matter jurisdiction and correspondingly, plaintiffs' ability to obtain access to court for redress of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in violation of this Court's Exxon Mobil rule?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Federal question jurisdiction usually vests in the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine represents a narrow exception to this general jurisdiction. In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 125 S.Ct. 1517 (2005), this Court emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is limited in scope, being “confined to ... cases brought by state-court losers ... inviting district court review and _ rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284. Four requirements must be met before this doctrine applies: the federal plaintiff lost in state court; the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment; the judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments. The questions presented by the instant case primarily involve the application of Rooker-Feldman to when a plaintiff brings claims independent of underlying state court judgments, and seeks, not to overturn state court judgments, but monetary damages and declaratory judgments that individual actors involved violated plaintiff's due process rights. The questions presented are: I. Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s purported “inextricably intertwined” ‘standard’ for evaluating jurisdictional claims under Rooker-Feldman arbitrarily and impermissibly limits district courts’ subject matter jurisdiction and correspondingly, plaintiffs’ ability to obtain access to court for redress of constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in violation of this Court’s Exxon Mobil rule? ii II. Does the arbitrary “inextricably intertwined” standard currently being applied by the Eleventh Circuit as a impermissible substitute for the fourpart test established by this court in Exxon Mobile open the door for abuse, necessitating supervisory action to preserve due process in State Bar proceedings and ensure aggrieved parties an opportunity in 1983 and declaratory judgment actions to fairly and fully litigate their claims in federal courts? III. Did the failure of Respondents to knowingly and willfully disclose exculpatory evidence for Petitioner in Bar proceedings (similar to Brady v. Maryland violations) constitute an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over a complaint involving these constitutional violations?