Whether the US government can circumvent constitutional limitations and defraud ~320 million American citizens

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 1. Whether the US government can circumvent constitutional limitations! and defraud ~320 million American citizens through hidden legal provisos, specifically the 26 CFR §31.3401(a)-3 authority “deeming” clauses operating through W-4 contractual agreements, which effectively waive? constitutional protections? 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in completely denying access to the court as part of a concerted effort to protect the government's fraud scheme by blocking any discussion/analysis of the “deeming” authority in 26 CFR §31.3401(a)-3, and whether the denial of court review violated constitutional due process protections as well as Supreme Court authority in 418 U.S. 5393 and 518 U.S. 3434? Additionally, whether the District Court can similarly also violate the foregoing Supreme Court authorities and due process rights in preemptively denying any future access to the court? 1 Namely Art I §2 & Art 1§ 9. 2 Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 95 §.Ct. 200, 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974) Waiver of such rights as these can be accomplished only by ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,' 3 Wolff v. Donnell 8212 679, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. + Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) we felt compelled to justify even this slight extension of the right of access to the courts ii 3. Whether the District Court also colluded with the foregoing fraudulent “deeming” scheme through misrepresentations and intentional evasion of any discussion/analysis of the “deeming” authority in 26 CFR §31.3401(a)-8, and whether the court acted fraudulently to block any remedy’ through crafted misrepresentations calculated to bypass the statutory authority of 26 USC §7422, §7483, as well ; as Supreme Court Bivens® authority. 4. What is the constitutional remedy and , disciplinary action for ANY court making false | allegations of frivolity based on carefully crafted misrepresentations of the facts with a clear objective to deny due process under the frivolity doctrine? 5. Whether ANY court Justices can be effectively ; “above the law?” by colluding to protect the fraudulent scheme allowed via the 26 CFR §31.3401(a)-3 “deeming” proviso? 5 Both equitable and statutory. 6 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) 7 Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 207 L.Ed.2d 907 (2020) In our system of government, as this Court has often stated, no one is above the law. 8 Johnson v. Powell, 393 U.S. 920, 89 S.Ct. 250, 21 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) It is, after all, the Constitution that creates in our people the faith that no one—not even the Department of Justice nor the military—is above the law. 9 Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367 (2004) As United States v. Nixon explained, these principles do not mean that the "President is above the law." iii 6. Whether there is a conflict of law between the long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding cases of Fraud and the statutory 2-year statute of limitations imposed by IRC §7422 and ‘ IRC §7433? 7. Whether this court can review “De Novo” government agency malfeasance when the courts below in their own nonfeasance!° and malfeasance!! refuse to do so? More specifically, can the IRS blatantly ignore the regulatory authority in section (b) of 26 CFR § 31.6051-1 despite being put on notice multiple times of their violation? If the Supreme Court quietly refuses to review lower court malfeasance, will that indicate on the public record that SCOTUS is also colluding with the lower courts to avoid any judicial legal analysis of the aforementioned CFR regulations? 10 Nonfeasance on the part of the Court of Appeals by refusing to review (or even