Whether a funding recipient may be liable in damages in a private action under Davis when the recipient's response did not itself cause any harassment actionable under Title IX

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner is among the thousands of school systems and other entities across the country that, as a condition of receiving federal funding, must comply with Title IX’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination. The primary enforcement mechanism, set forth expressly in the statute, is through complaints to and investigations by federal agencies. But this Court has found implied in the statute a private right of action against recipients, for monetary damages, in limited circumstances. The scope of that implied right must remain carefully calibrated, this Court has stressed, because the Spending Clause requires that recipients receive clear notice of any conditions on their funding. This case concerns two of this Court’s limitations on the implied right of action in cases alleging studenton-student sexual harassment. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, this Court held that a funding recipient may be liable for its response to such allegations only where it “subjects its students to harassment” and is “deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [the recipient] ha[s] actual knowledge.” 526 U.S. 641, 650 (1999) (cleaned up). The lower courts are indisputably divided over the meaning of these limitations. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a funding recipient may be liable in damages in a private action under Davis when the recipient’s response did not itself cause any harassment actionable under Title IX. 2. Whether the requirement of “actual knowledge” in a private action under Davis is met when a funding recipient lacks a subjective belief that any harassment actionable under Title IX occurred. (i)