Did the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of the requisite 'extraordinary circumstances', by affirming the District Court's denial of Petitioner Diana Berber's Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motion to set aside the final judgment, stray from the trail which had been blazed by this Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), and Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), and thereby inflict on Ms. Berber a manifest injustice?

QUESTION PRESENTED Did the Court of Appeals, despite the presence of the requisite “extraordinary circumstances”, by affirming the District Court’s denial of Petitioner Diana Berber’s Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motion to set aside the final judgment, stray from the trail which had been blazed by this Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949), and Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988), and thereby inflict on Ms. Berber a manifest injustice?