Whether the presumption of innocence, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair trial permit a court to allow the grand jury prosecutor to take the stand and offer such testimony

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Willard Anthony’s jury trial for aggravated rape and human trafficking should have been an ordinary credibility battle between the accused (he said) and the accuser (she said). The State’s allegations and the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses were flawed from the outset, and Mr. Anthony testified in his own defense. In an extraordinary departure from ordinary trial practice, however, the State was permitted to call the grand jury prosecutor to the stand to testify in his official capacity. The prosecutor testified at length and over repeated objections and mistrial motions from the defense that he firmly believed in the credibility of the “victims,” the guilt of the defendant, the strength of the State’s evidence (both known and unknown to the jury), and his opinion (at times incorrect) about the law applicable to the case. Following the prosecutor’s testimony, the jury resolved the credibility disputes in favor of the State. The questions presented by this case are: 1. Whether the presumption of innocence, the right to confrontation, and the right to a fair trial permit a court to allow the grand jury prosecutor to take the stand and offer such testimony. 2. Whether the admission of such prosecutorial testimony constitutes structural error or, instead, is subject to harmless error review. 3. Whether a reviewing court’s conclusion that the evidence at trial supports the defendant’s (i) convictions even excluding the grand jury prosecutor’s testimony meets the State’s burden of proving harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. (ii)