Whether the rule in Lee v. United States applies to cases involving the rejection of plea offers

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner William Casiano faced a charge that carried a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence. His attorney never told him about this minimum mandatory sentence when discussing a plea offer of 3 years. Instead, defense counsel encouraged him to go to trial, telling him he would likely only receive a sentence of 7 to 12 years if he lost. Counsel also failed to advise him of a subsequent 12-year plea offer. After a jury found him guilty, the trial court sentenced Mr. Casiano to a 45-year term of imprisonment. Mr. Casiano brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. At an evidentiary hearing, his attorney admitted he did not know about the 25-year minimum mandatory prior to sentencing. Had he known about it, his advice about the plea offer would have changed, and he would have emphasized the risks of trial. Mr. Casiano testified he would have accepted the plea offers if he knew about the minimum mandatory sentence. The postconviction court found that he failed to establish Strickland prejudice. A federal habeas court agreed. It declined to credit Mr. Casiano’s “after-the-fact” assertions and found no reasonable probability that he would have accepted either offer. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a certificate of appealability. This petition presents the following questions for review: 1. Does the rule in Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017), that directs courts to ii credit contemporaneous evidence, and not “post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded,” apply in cases involving the rejection of plea offers? 2. Has a habeas petitioner established a “reasonable probability” that he would have accepted a lost plea offer where his testimony is corroborated by his attorney’s admission that he failed to advise him of a 25-year mandatory minimum and would have advised him differently had he known about it, where there is a large disparity between the sentence imposed and the sentence called for in the plea deal, and where’ the petitioner established a contemporaneous willingness to plead guilty to a lesser offense? 3. Does a habeas petitioner make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), as required for the issuance of a certificate of appealability, where he identifies factually analogous decisions that support his claim for habeas relief?