Whether § 411(b)(1)(A)'s 'knowledge' element requires 'actual knowledge,' as this Court held, or 'intent to defraud,' as the Ninth Circuit held on remand

QUESTION PRESENTED Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a copyright holder generally may not bring a “civil action for infringement” unless the claimant has registered the work with the Copyright Office. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). Registrations containing “naccurate information” are invalid, depriving the claimant of the ability to bring an infringement action, if: “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate,” and (B) the Register would have refused registration had it known of the inaccuracy. Id. § 411(b)(1). In 2021, this Court took up this case to decide a question on which the Courts of Appeals were split: whether § 411(b)’s “knowledge” element requires intent to defraud the Copyright Office. Then-petitioner Unicolors, however, abandoned the intent-to-defraud argument at the merits stage. Left only with a subsidiary question to the original question presented, a majority of this Court construed § 411(b) to require “actual knowledge,” meaning “actual, subjective awareness of both the facts and law.” Pet. App. 89a. The Court held that “if Congress had intended to impose a scienter standard other than actual knowledge, it would have said so explicitly.” Zbid. But the Court did not directly “answer[] the ultimate question about fraud.” Jd. at 98a (Thomas, J., dissenting). On remand, the Ninth Circuit departed from this Court’s holding and concluded that § 411(b)(1) codified a scienter of “intent to defraud” rather than actual knowledge. The question presented is: Whether § 411(b)(1)(A)’s “knowledge” element requires “actual knowledge,” as this Court held, or “intent to defraud,” as the Ninth Circuit held on remand. (I)