Shoman Kasbekar, et al. v. Ivy Station Community Association, Inc., et al.
DueProcess Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Whether a state court acts with jurisdiction and in a manner consistent with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when it enters judgment on a pleading expressly disallowed by the state's rules of civil procedure and orders a person to pay damages on claims not asserted against that person but against another person
QUESTIONS PRESENTED After holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine jurisdictionally barred it from determining whether a state court judgment is void ab initio and subject to collateral attack, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a Georgia court acted with jurisdiction and in a manner consistent with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when it entered judgment on a pleading expressly disallowed by Georgia’s Civil Practice Act and thereby ordered a plaintiff to pay damages on claims asserted against a third-party and the third-party to pay damages on claims asserted against the plaintiff. Refusing to apply Georgia law to determine the validity of a Georgia court judgment, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that two pleadings, one asserting claims against the plaintiff and the other asserting claims against the third-party, were “substantively identical” and, as such, the plaintiff and the third-party each had notice to defend claims asserted solely against the other. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state court acts with jurisdiction and in a manner consistent with Fourteenth Amendment Due Process when it enters judgment on a pleading expressly disallowed by the state’s rules of civil procedure and orders a person to pay damages on claims not asserted against that person but against another person. ii 2. Whether a federal court acts contrary to the mandate of 28 U.S.C. §1788, the Full Faith and Credit Act, when, in a collateral attack challenging the validity of a state court judgment, it refuses to apply the law of the state from which the judgment was taken to determine whether the judgment is void ab initio and subject to collateral attack. 3. Whether a United States court of appeals departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when it: a) Converts a district court’s facial dismissal into a factual one and makes findings of fact for the first time on appeal; b) Bypasses the jurisdictional question of Article III standing decided by a district court and issues an opinion on the merits; and c) Sua sponte raises an affirmative defense and requires a complaint to anticipate and negate that affirmative defense to survive a motion to dismiss.