Whether a JASTA claim for civil conspiracy requires only that acts of international terrorism be a foreseeable consequence of the terrorism sanctions evasion conspiracy Respondents joined or, as the court below required, that (1) Respondents themselves shared a common intent to commit acts of international terrorism or (2) that the terrorists somehow directly assisted Respondents in evading the terrorism sanctions

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Congress enacted the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (2016), Pet. App. 150a-155a, to provide enhanced relief to Americans injured by terrorist attacks that were committed, planned, or authorized by foreign terrorist organizations (“FTOs”). JASTA allows the victims of such attacks to assert a cause of action against anyone who “conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). Congress’s objective was to “provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief’ from any party that “provided material support, directly or indirectly,” to terrorist organizations that injured Americans. JASTA § 2(b), Pet. App. 152a. In this case, (except for Bank Saderat Plc, which was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) for its role in money laundering for FTOs) entered into Deferred Prosecution Agreements (“DPAs”) admitting that they unlawfully conspired with Iranian entities to circumvent U.S. counter-terrorism sanctions. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals erroneously held that this admitted conduct did not constitute a civil conspiracy under the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a JASTA claim for civil conspiracy requires only that acts of international terrorism be a foreseeable consequence of the terrorism sanctions evasion conspiracy Respondents joined or, as the court below required, that (1) Respondents themselves shared a common intent to commit acts of international terrorism or (2) ii that the terrorists somehow directly assisted Respondents in evading the terrorism sanctions. 2. Whether JASTA civil conspiracy liability reaches a conspiracy that furthers acts of international terrorism by knowingly enabling material support for FTOs or, as the court below held, only a conspiracy that—conversely—is furthered by acts of international terrorism.