Can a governmental entity escape 42 US.C. § 1983 liability for failing to have procedural safeguards in its speech licensing scheme by—only after being sued ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued for those violations—amending its regulations to remove any content-based speech regulations therein?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain a variance from Respondent, the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals, to erect a digital billboard, Petitioner, GEFT Outdoor, L.L.C. sued Respondents, Monroe County, Indiana, and the Monroe County Board of Zoning Appeals, alleging, in part, that Monroe County’s Zoning Ordinance contained unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Monroe County’s Zoning Ordinance’s variance process contained unconstitutional prior restraints on speech, but refused to grant GEFT Outdoor, L.L.C.’s request to erect the digital billboard, finding that the unconstitutional provisions were severable. Pet.App. 62-65. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, in part, holding that the district court’s severance analysis was correct and, following Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002), reversed, in part, holding that Monroe County, Indiana’s Zoning Ordinance’s variance process did not contain unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. Pet.App. 9-15, 18-21. The questions presented are: 1. Can a governmental entity escape 42 US.C. § 1983 liability for failing to have procedural safeguards in its speech licensing scheme by—only after being sued ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued for those violations—amending its regulations to remove any content-based speech regulations therein? 2. Are definitive, objective standards required to be contained in speech licensing schemes that lack content-based regulations, but also lack any standards setting forth the bases for denying a license to speak?