Did the Bankruptcy Court abuse its discretion by sanctioning Delafield for asserting attorney-client privilege on behalf of his clients?

question presented is: Does a bankruptcy court have inherent authority to award a serious non-compensatory punitive sanction on an attorney which is not measured by actual monetary harm but for “inconvenience” to his clients? 3. In Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994), this Court ruled that sanctioned parties must be afforded the protections of criminal due process where sanctions are punitive, but not where they are compensatory. Here, the UST argued for sanctions to vindicate the authority of the court. The bankruptcy court stated “the pain is going to be felt at home” when local attorneys join law firms.” The third question presented is: If the second question is answered in the affirmative and a bankruptcy court is permitted to impose a serious non-compensatory punitive sanction, should an attorney be afforded the protections of criminal due process? 4. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968) : ‘ this Court held the charge must be known before the disciplinary proceeding commences. In this case, the Fourth Circuit approves of new allegations asserted ; iti ; . at trial and asserted after the close of evidence in the written closing argument of the UST because other allegations were detailed in a written complaint and because “Delafield was given the opportunity to a ; respond” to the new allegations “through his direct testimony” at trial and post-trial “briefing.” Pet. App. ‘ ; Ila. The fourth question presented is: Must the : ; charge be known before the disciplinary proceeding commences because due process requires the party ‘ subject to the sanctions proceedings be given notice in advance of the specific conduct which is alleged to be sanctionable? 5. In Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. : 347, 353 (1964), this Court held that an : unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like — an ex post facto law. In this case, the bankruptcy court cited New York case law when it expanded the application of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. Pet. App. 131a. Furthermore, this Court has held that bad faith is personal to the offending : attorney and inherent power does not permit a federal court to sanction other lawyers at the firm, or : even the firm itself, on a respondeat superior-type theory. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 DO _ (1991). ; The fifth question presented is: Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion by sanctioning Delafield where the bankruptcy court applied the ; wrong standard, created a strict liability standard, and improperly created an ex post facto law? iv