Whether 'power production capacity' refers to a facility's maximum net output to the grid at any one time, or whether that term instead refers to the maximum amount of power that a facility can create

QUESTION PRESENTED The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) created a class of electricity generators called “qualifying facilities” that receive highly favorable regulatory and commercial treatment, including a legal guarantee that electric utilities must purchase all the power they generate. Under PURPA, a “qualifying facility” must have “a power production capacity, which *** is not greater than 80 megawatts.” 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A). This case involves a proposed solar energy project that can create up to 160 megawatts of power, but that will deliver only 80 megawatts to the electric grid at any given time. Over Petitioners’ protest, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission certified this project as a “qualifying facility.” The D.C. Circuit upheld the certification by deferring to the agency’s statutory interpretation under Chevron. In dissent, Judge Walker sharply criticized the panel’s opinion for embracing the same “Chevron maximalism” employed in the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc. v. Raimondo, a case in which this Court has since granted certiorari. The questions presented are: 1. Whether “power production capacity” refers to a facility’s maximum net output to the grid at any one time, or whether that term instead refers to the maximum amount of power that a facility can create. 2. Whether this Court should reconsider how and when Chevron should apply, or at least clarify that courts must exhaust normal tools before concluding that a statute is “ambiguous” at Chevron step one. (D