Whether the word 'substantial' in the governing statute CPLR 5601(a) and the New York State Constitution provision for appeals as of right on constitutional grounds violates due-process

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Questions Presented are: 1. The word “substantial” is not found in the governing statute, CPLR 5601 (a), or the New York State Constitution provision that provides for appeals as of right on constitutional grounds. N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 3(b)(1)-(2) There is a conflict in the circuits as to what the word “substantial” means, and whether dismissal of appeals as of right sua sponte deprives an aggrieved party of his or her due process rights under to constitutionally protected pension rights. 2. Whether the allegations of disparate | treatment in the New York State Teach| ers’ Retirement System’s calculations of a } members’ salary, service credits and pension and where the appeal involves the validity of a state or federal statute and , support an appeal as a of right pursuant to CPLR 5601. 3. Petitioner’s argument that rejected by | the courts below that she has a constitutionally protected right in her salary, ser, vice credits and pension, violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Whether Petitioner raised a substantial constitutional objection to the violation of her due process rights thus entitling her to an appeal as of right under CPLR 5601. ; i QUESTIONS PRESENTED -— Continued 4. Whether the State of New York Court of Appeals standing on sua sponte dismissal of appeals as of rights and final orders upon the grounds that no appeal lies as of right from the unanimous orders of the | Appellate Division absent direct involve} ment of a substantial constitutional question with notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the dismissal was unconstitutional and violates a constitutional property rights where the same court conflicts with its holding in Lippman v. Bd. of Educ. of the Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. 5. Where a state government infringes on and deviates from its own past practices and established rules and regulations, including by statute or law to deprive a public employee of his or her constitutional property rights to pension retirement benefits under the state retirement plan, was such a deviation and deprivation unconstitutional and whether the New York States Retirement System’s arbitrary and outrageously capricious actions violate the impairment clause of the state constitution and whether the public employee becomes a part of an employee’s contract of employment if the employee contributes at any time any amount toward the benefits. New York State Const., V, § 7. Be | iti QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued 6. Pension benefits in a retirement plan are contractually and constitutionally protected property rights. Article V, § 7 of the New York State Constitution prohib. its the diminishing and impairments of contracts, whether a public-school teacher, possesses a binding contractual relationship between employee and employer, and whether membership in a public retirement system is a contractual relationship that is subject to Article V, § 7 of the New York State Constitution and the parties collective bargaining agreement. 7. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohib, . its a state or government from infringement on and/or deprivation of a person’s | life, liberty, or property without due process of law and/or deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. Whether petitioner’s rights as a , tenured teacher were denied prior to the | taking of her pension benefits without due process of law in violation of the Fifth _ and Fourteenth Amendments and Education Law § 3020-a, and whether the taking of her entitlement to compensation and property rights was unconstitutional. NY Const., Article V, §7, US. Const., amend. V, U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. iv QUESTIONS PRESENTED Continued 8. Under this Court’s precedents there are objective standards that require recusal when the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, whether the