Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment

QUESTION PRESENTED This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important issue related to the preservation of legal claims for appeal. Parties may appeal only from “final decisions of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus the general rule is that “[a]n appeal from the final judgment brings up all antecedent issues,” In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987), and that “all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree,” Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1967). “Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at the end of the case.” Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding these precepts, the circuits have squarely divided over whether purely legal claims denied at summary judgment are reviewable on appeal after a jury trial where those claims have not been reasserted in a post-trial motion. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 8-3-1 circuit split. But the panel declared itself bound by Fourth Circuit precedent and held that it would “not review, under any standard, the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits, even in circumstances where the issue rejected on summary judgment and not reasserted in a post-trial motion is a purely legal one.” That holding was sole basis on which the court refused to consider petitioner’s PLRA exhaustion defense—and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important question. The question presented is: Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment. (i)