Whether a special rule that prohibits parties from adding an arbitration provision to a contract by mutual assent manifested by conduct, when such modifications are permitted under ordinary contract law principles, discriminates against arbitration and is contrary to the FAA?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., requires courts to treat agreements to arbitrate like any other contract, and it displaces any aspect of state law that singles out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment. In Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017), this Court made clear that state common-law rules violate the FAA when they make it harder to enter into an arbitration agreement than another contract. The Court explained that more demanding treatment cannot be justified by arguing that arbitration effectively waives the right to a jury trial. The question presented is: Whether a special rule that prohibits parties from adding an arbitration provision to a contract by mutual assent manifested by conduct, when such modifications are permitted under ordinary contract law principles, discriminates against arbitration and is contrary to the FAA?