Whether the voluntariness of the waiver of the personal right to an Article III adjudication under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and consent to non-Article III arbitration under the FAA is governed by the heightened constitutional standard, or by the state law of contract unconscionability?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Although the waiver of the personal right to an Article III adjudication and other fundamental constitutional rights must be voluntary, the Sixth Circuit here and other federal courts have rejected the applicability of the heightened constitutional standard for voluntary consent in cases involving arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and instead employ a substantially less rigorous analysis of unconscionability under state contract law to find the waiver enforceable. Question 1 is: Whether the voluntariness of the waiver of the personal right to an Article III adjudication under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) and consent to non-Article III arbitration under the FAA is governed by the heightened constitutional standard, or by the state law of contract unconscionability? Il. CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), commands the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over class actions with 100 or more class members whose aggregated claims against a defendant that is a citizen of a different state exceed $5,000,000, as here. CAFA’s express purposes include “restor[ing] the intent of the framers... by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under diversity jurisdiction,” and “benefit[ting] society by ... lowering consumer prices.” CAFA § 2(b), 119 Stat. 5. The Sixth Circuit held that it could give effect to both CAFA and the FAA by exercising CAFA jurisdiction to compel one bilateral arbitration under the FAA, thereby rendering CAFA’s ii command to adjudicate class actions and its express purposes nugatory. Question 2 is: Whether CAFA and its express purposes inherently and irreconcilably conflict with and override the FAA?