Whether a cause of action for retirement pay can accrue and for the statute of limitations to run before a service member receives a disability rating of at least 30 percent

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 10 U.S.C. § 1201 provides, in relevant part, that a member of the armed forces is entitled to retirement pay when the Secretary of Veterans Affairs assigns him a disability rating of at least 30 percent. 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a), 1201(b)(3)(B). Petitioner Lewis B. Jones (“Jones”) was separated from service in 1988 with a 10 percent disability rating based on migraines, after being struck in the eye by the door of an armored personnel carrier. Years later, after advances in medical technology, it was determined that the accident had, in addition to migraines, also caused Traumatic Brain Injury with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Jones’ disability rating was increased, but Jones, in 2020, was denied retirement pay. In what dissenting Judge Newman termed “a significant change in law and policy,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Jones’ 2020 suit to obtain retirement pay accrued in 1988 and was therefore time-barred under the Tucker Act, even though: (i) Jones’ disability rating was far below 30 percent in 1988; and (ii) it was not until 2020 that Jones was denied retirement benefits while having a disability rating of at least 30 percent. Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that subsequent advances in medical technology cannot suspend the accrual of a claim for retirement pay. The questions presented are as follows. 1. Whether a cause of action for retirement pay can accrue and for the statute of limitations to run before a service member receives a disability rating of at least 30 percent, as the Federal Circuit held, or ii whether such a cause of action may instead be brought after the service member is denied retirement pay after attaining the requisite 30 percent disability rating. 2. Whether the Federal Circuit erred in holding that the “accrual suspension rule”—i.e., the principle that the accrual of a cause of action against the United States is suspended during the period of time that the nature of the injury is inherently unknowable—is categorically inapplicable to veterans’ injuries that were previously unknowable due to insufficient medical knowledge or technology, or to injuries that were otherwise undiagnosable at the time of a service member’s discharge from the Armed Services.