Whether a 'judicial taking' under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a cognizable cause of action

QUESTIONS PRESENTED For decades, Petitioners and their predecessors have owned beachfront property along Lake Michigan in northwestern Indiana. Their deeds clearly indicate ownership of the beach below any conceivable definition of the lake’s ordinary high-water mark. Petitioners used their private beach for gatherings and recreation, paid taxes on it, and in 1980, when the United States requested a walking easement across the property for the benefit of the public, they agreed—in exchange for a federal promise to maintain and clean it. But four years ago, the Indiana Supreme Court in Gunderson v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. 2018), declared that the State held exclusive title to all land abutting Lake Michigan up to the ordinary high-water mark. The decree effectively extinguished Petitioners’ rights to the beach and transferred authority to the State Department of Natural Resources. Petitioners, who were not parties in Gunderson, alleged that Gunderson decreed a taking of their property without compensation. They sued to enjoin the state officials responsible for implementing the decision from depriving them of their property rights, including the fundamental right to exclude the public from their property. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a “judicial taking” under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is a cognizable cause of action. 2. Whether a property owner who is deprived of property under the authority of a state court decision may seek prospective injunctive relief in federal court to halt encroachment on their property by state officials acting under the authority of that decision.